China as a "spokesman of the weak": The origins of China's policy towards the developing world China's wish to become a key player in global justice is largely due to its historical experience, that is, having been a semi-colony subjected to 100 years of humiliation. Thus, China presents itself more like a developing country despite having the second largest economy in the world. Party of the Soviet Union, the result of which was the so-called Polish October, which was Poland's attempt to recover sovereignty by pursuing socialism in its own national way. This act by Poland received important, albeit limited and conditional, support from the PRC against the stance of the Soviet Union. Yet, China took a different position in the assessment of Hungary's political upheaval that occurred in the same year, which culminated in Soviet military intervention.
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According to Michael H. Hunt, there were three major foreign policy concerns for the early Communist Party of China: impact of foreign imperialism, special relations with the Soviet Union, and identification with the weak and oppressed people with whom China could reform the international system which was defined to serve the strong. The latter, "held up the best of all."
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Compared to other areas of the PRC's foreign policy, China's policy towards the developing world received seemingly minor attention. In Ian Taylor's words, this fact is "curious given that policy pronouncements have often placed the developing or 'Third' world as central to Beijing's foreign concerns." 11 Indeed, given the PRC's various twists and turns in regard to their relations with the Soviet Union (and its successor, Russia) and the US, by far the most pertaining political arena where China has been successfully combating "hegemony" of the major world powers by lending economic and technological support is to its developing-country allies of the African continent. The so-called Bandung Line of China's international conduct of peaceful coexistence and noninterference in another nation's affairs is, apart from the UN Charter, a major point of reference of the principles which China's current key foreign policy initiative -the "One Belt, One Road" -has been grounded upon. 12 The "South-South" rationale behind OBOR was put forth explicitly by the head of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Jin Liqun: "The Chinese experience illustrates that infrastructure investment paves the way for broad-based economic social development, and poverty alleviation comes as a natural consequence of that." 13 
China's policy towards developing countries and its Central and Eastern European dimension
The crucial tools in upgrading China's present global position are outward foreign direct investments (OFDIs) and OFDI infrastructure-related diplomacy, which Willy Wo-lap Lam calls the "Tanzania-Railway model" or "renminbi diplomacy," serving to create China's positive image in Africa and Latin America. Its key feature is that "Chinese experts are involved in the construction 9 Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, "The Polish Crisis of 1956 and Polish-Chinese Relations Viewed from Beijing," in The Polish October 1956 in World Politics, ed. Jan Rowiński (Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2007), 75-114. According to Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, Mao Zedong supported the Polish party, which opposed the Soviet intervention and thus revealed the long-hidden dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union's chauvinistic global power status and the CPSU's behaviour as a "despotic father of a nation" (laozidang, 老子党). Although Mao never publicly voiced any reservations towards the Soviet party and hid his lack of eagerness, the situation was for him, which is beyond any doubt, a chance to question the leading role of the Soviet party in the socialist camp. 13 James Kynge, "How the Silk Road plans will be financed: Not all project are driven by commercial logic," Financial Times International Edition, 9 May 2016, https://next.ft.com/content/e83ced94-0bd8-11e6-9456-444ab5211a2f. As Jin further explained, the AIIB with its 57 member countries plans to increase operations gradually, investing $1.5-$2 billion in infrastructure in 2016, $3-$5 billion in 2017, and around $10 billion in 2018.
-and very often the operation and maintenance -of the project. This will generate a lot of spillover benefits, including the promotion of 'people-to-people diplomacy'. Given the thoroughly diverse conditions and different timing in which China has developed a platform for cooperation in Africa through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, established in 2000) and in CEE ("16+1," 2002), one may assume that mechanisms of cooperation with both entities would differ significantly. However, a comparative analysis of FOCAC and "16+1" shows that the structure of both formats are basically analogous. The biggest noticeable difference between the Chinese platforms of cooperation in Africa and CEE is the absence of any significant political component within the latter. Contrary to FOCAC, China's cooperation with CEE has been characterised by the dominant role of bilateral meetings of the highest political representatives of both sides. However, in this regard, a turning point seemed to be the "16+1" Summit in Suzhou in 2015, which was for the first time attended by all of the government leaders or presidents of the European 16 and China. Apart from these differences, both FOCAC and the "16+1" operational mechanisms are very much akin, particularly in the decision-making process as well as organisational structure on the Chinese side. 21 The variances are mainly due to lessons drawn by Beijing from the shortcomings that became apparent after a few years of FOCAC's functioning. This is to be found primarily in the absence of institutions of regular multilateral meetings in the SinoAfrican cooperation format. In the case of "16+1," such a role might be attributed to Quarterly Meetings on China-CEE and the "16+1" Business Council. The other difference is the frequency of the summits under both initiatives. In the case of FOCAC, such meetings are held once every three years, while in "16+1," annually. 22 This is mainly due to the relatively well-established position of the PRC in Africa as the main objectives that guided the establishment of FOCAC -political support for China in the international arena and access to natural resources in Africa -have been achieved. In case of the institutionalisation of China-CEE cooperation in "16+1," the objectives for Beijing have been mostly related to accessing the "16" countries' (and EU) markets through the implementation of the OBOR initiative which is to be complementary to the establishment of transportation and logistics infrastructure in the region.
According to Willy Lam, China's "infrastructure diplomacy" in the developing world "has been even extended to the developed countries in the European Union. European countries!" 24 Of note is the initial phrase, "go forward hand in hand" (携手并进, xieshoubingjin), as it is usually used by the Chinese in regard to developing countries in Africa.
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Though not explicitly pinning CEE countries to the developing world at this point in time, three years later, President Xi Jinping stated outright the position of CEE in China's foreign policy. At the November 2015 meeting of "16+1," Xi described the nature of Sino-CEE cooperation, which in the eyes of China opened a new path of development of relations between China and traditional friends, introducing innovations to the practice of relations between China and Europe, establishing a new platform for South-South cooperation, which has the characteristics appropriate for North-South cooperation. In the next step, China and Central and Eastern European countries cooperation must be based on mutual benefit, openness and tolerance, strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields.
[…] the realization of "16+1" cooperation must be fully complimentary to the construction of the "One Belt, One Road."
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This notion was reinstated by Renmin Ribao on June 14, 2016, prior to Xi's visit to Serbia and Poland: "President Xi Jinping's visit in Central and Eastern Europe, will consolidate the traditional friendship, deepen pragmatic cooperation, share the fruits of development, [and] open new chapter in the development of relations between China and Central and Eastern Europe." The "16 +1" cooperation was described as a "subregional" one, separating at the same time the relations with CEE from the EU by stating, "introducing innovations to the practice of relations between China and Europe, establishing a new platform for the South-South cooperation, which has the characteristics appropriate for North-South cooperation" -thus repeating the same words aired by Xi Jinping six months earlier.
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It seems interesting to equate the "16+1" relations with the level of cooperation between the countries of the South, ergo developing as seen in policy pronouncements of China's political leadership. Thus, China-Europe relations are in actual fact divided into two realms: the traditional North-South dichotomy of Western European countries and, as can be seen in the quote above, the postcommunist CEE countries, categorised in Chinese foreign policy as developing. As far as "traditional friends" is concerned, it is a quite explicit reference to the communist past of the CEE countries, which were considered by the Chinese leadership as a political and geographical periphery of (Western) Europe.
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By defining Sino-CEE relations within the framework of alleged South-South solidarity, this rhetoric suggests further association with China's historical memory which has been pointed out by the Chinese historian Zheng Wang as an important part (along with economic and military factors) of China's identity and its behaviour in the international arena. The atmosphere of "avenging national humiliation" (雪恥, xuechi) nurtured by the Chinese authorities has also pro- found implications for domestic policy, resulting in the intensification of anti-Western nationalist sentiments in Chinese society. 29 The late diplomat Wu Jianmin, China's former ambassador to
France and a former president of China Foreign Affairs University, warned in April 2016 that with the growing diversity of the public view on various issues, there has also been a growing parochial nationalism based on the conviction "that the people of China are losing out because they are still being subjected to the exploitation of Western countries via international cooperation."
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Countries of the CEE "16," with the exception of those in the former Austro-Hungarian empire, were not involved in the process of "carving the melon," as the Chinese have called the division of China into spheres of influence by the Western powers and Japan. Via the "unequal treaties" in the period between the First Opium War and the end of World War II, China was forcibly subjugated by the established world powers. One may consider that these historical facts hardly matter to contemporary Chinese foreign policy makers, dismissing it as being far-fetched. Yet, given the example of narratives of the Chinese media accompanying Czech President Milos Zeman's 2015 visit to Beijing, this idea might be considered not to be entirely at odds with reality. In an analysis of China's major online news and commentary site, Guancha, summarised by Runya T. Qiaoan,
The Czech Republic […] was described as a country which has a similar traumatic history as China and now attempts to draw a line between itself and the West. "One hundred years of humiliation," which is a term often used to summarise the contemporary history of China, was borrowed to sum up the turbulent Czech 20th century destiny between Germany and Russia. This rhetoric would easily arise sympathy and an "us" feeling among Chinese. Besides, when it comes to the divergent routes of the Czech Republic and China after 1989, the Czech Republic was presented as a victim of the western neo-liberal pitfall, in the sense that the Czech economy has [sic!] suffered in the 2008 financial crisis before it even ever took off.
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Thus, the Chinese political circles' critical attitude towards Western values has begun to be convergent with the recently gaining-in-prominence trends in leading CEE countries, that is, the trends of questioning the values of liberal democracy within their respective political establishments.
In case of the Czech Republic, the rationale behind its flourishing relations with the PRC has been explained by President Miloš Zeman explicitly on ideological grounds which brings associations with the South-South community of the "weak and oppressed." The Czech president attributed a "very bad relationship between China and the former government of the Czech Republic" as this "government had been very submissive to the pressure from the US and from the EU." However, in Zeman's opinion, the Czech is "again an independent country" which formulates foreign policy "based on its own national interest, and do not interfere with the internal affairs of any other country." Chinese investment in CEE is a relatively new phenomenon, and their share in the total OFDI in Europe is barely 10%. Ágnes Szunomár has concluded that the role of Chinese investments within the CEE region increased significantly after the 2008 economic crisis, and their importance for the region as well as the share of total OFDI will grow. Moreover, Chinese investments in CEE vary in motif from other countries. In addition to the economic element, "the level and warmth of political relations with the host country" must also be taken into account (e.g. Hisense's decision to invest in Hungary). Among the determinants of Chinese investments, Szunomár has pointed out the market potential resulting from EU membership, which allows one to avoid trade barriers; cheap and qualified labour force (countries serve as assembly plants); and the growing trend of strategic asset-seeking (mergers and acquisitions), including brand seeking, new technologies, and market niches.
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China's focus on CEE is clearly related to its geographic location and logistic potential which may facilitate trade expansion into both Eastern and Western European countries. Since Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reform and opening up, China's interior has lagged behind the eastern coastal region which was given priority in development and attracting foreign investments. Contrary to this scheme, Xi Jinping's OBOR initiative at the internal level was formulated, in general, to open up China's less-developed western and central provinces, cities, and autonomous regions to the outside world (mostly westward to Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Europe). 34 Thus, given OBOR's infrastructure-related economic orientation, it might be considered to some extent as an outward extension of "Open-up the West" (西部大开发, xibu dakaifa) strategy. Announced by Jiang Zemin in 1999 as a program of investments in economic infrastructure, railways, highways, communication facilities, the energy sector, and large-scale industries intended to level out the differences in development between China's west and east. An important factor in the westward direction of OBOR is naturally the geographical proximity of China's west and countries situated along the New Silk Road, as Calla Wimer put this potential for trade: "Yining on Xinjiang's western border is closer to Warsaw, Poland (4500 km), than it is Tokyo, Japan (4900 km). The importance of CEE as a region is mainly due to its geographical position as a gateway to the EU market for Chinese products. However, attempts to institutionalise measures and coordination mechanisms between the countries within "16+1" format in conjunction with investments can lead one to guess about the growing political importance of some of them. They could be forcing the political interests of China in the international arena, be it the most revealing cases of Hungary and the Czech Republic. Both countries are among top receivers of Chinese investments in the CEE region. As of the period since the "16+1" format was officially established in 2012 until mid-2016, they have received as follows: the Czech Republic, 1.32 billion USD; Hungary, 6.1 billion USD. They are also neighbouring countries that are relatively close in terms of population, 9.85 million and 10.55 million, and area, 93,000 sq km and 79,000 sq km, respectively, competing to be China's gateway to Europe.
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Politicisation of Chinese investments in the Czech Republic
In the "South-South" dimension of Sino-CEE cooperation, the most illuminating case is that of the Czech Republic, which until recently was one of the staunchest critics of China regarding human rights and now has become the apparent regional leader of the "16+1" cooperation. Sino-Czech relations reached their zenith in March 2016, when Prague welcomed a PRC leader for the first time in its history. The result of this meeting was the signing of a strategic partnership between both states.
In the 1990s, voices critical to the communist regime in China were quite common in CEE, with the Czech Republic being the most prominent of all during Vaclav Havel's tenure as president. 45 It must be noted that this reciprocity holds great diplomatic as well as financial weight as about $4 billion Chinese investment was expected to flow into the Czech Republic in 2016, with up to $10 billion more in the upcoming five years.
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The Chinese leader was welcomed by the Czech authorities in a highly ceremonial atmosphere, receiving a "token of highest honor" from Prague City Mayor Adriana Krnáčová. This symbol, according to the Communist Party mouthpiece, China Daily, is "representing deepening friendship and partnership with China." 47 However, Xi Jinping was presented with "the key" soon after
Mayor Krnáčová signed an agreement with her Beijing counterpart Wang Anshun on their new sister city status. Such an agreement between both capitals should not attract an unusual amount of attention despite the fact that it includes a politicised paragraph rather unseen in city-to-city cooperation. In a five-year agreement, the following standard areas of cooperation were set: tourism, trade, culture, health, and education. The controversies arose due to the fact that within the agreement China included a provision regarding the need for Prague to uphold the "One China Policy" and referring to Taiwan as an "inseparable part of China." Although the majority of countries, including the Czech Republic, accept the "One China Policy," but placing a similar note in a regional-level agreement was, at least in case of Sino-Czech relations, unprecedented. This resulted in some city councillors fearing that China was economically blackmailing the city, in the case that Prague was not to approve an agreement in the way that China envisioned. One can thus see this as a prime example of the political element in China's economic expansion in the CEE. According to the leader of the Green Party in the City Council, Matěj Stropnický, city councillors who voted favourably for the sister city agreement only did so out of fear for losing Chinese investments that are meant to flow into the Czech capital. The politician concluded that "partnerships should not include ultimatums, especially not at the start."
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Furthermore, it must be noted that during Xi's visit to Prague, in the published commentaries in Renmin Ribao and on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website, the "16+1" format rarely appeared. Rather, phrases such as "the cooperation of 17 countries," China-CEE cooperation as well as wider European cooperation (omitting "EU") were used. The comments mostly related to bilateral relations between China and the Czech Republic. Most likely the reason behind this was to have a redundant measure in case China would not be given market-economy status by the EU and US. By establishing strong bilateral ties then each partner would, if such a scenario were to happen, become another "log" on the Chinese export "bonfire." Energy at 229th place in the world with a revenue of 41.845 billion USD, compared to its 342nd position the previous year. 50 According to the company's website, in recent years, with the acquisition of overseas resources as its core activity, CEFC China integrates finance with energy by establishing an all-encompassing financial platform through investing in logistics and infrastructure in Central Asia, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean, where it owns more than 1,000 gas stations and over 100 transshipment stations that form a vast system of oil and gas terminals integrating refining, storage, transportation, and sales in Europe. The rationale behind the establishment of its second (after Shanghai) headquarters in the Czech Republic was to "conduct international banking businesses and investment focusing on airlines, aircraft manufacturing, steel, food, and nuclear power plants." 51 In March 2016, during Xi Jinping's visit to Prague, CEFC became the first ever Chinese private company to have a majority stake in a European bank with its acquisition of controlling shares of J&T Finance Group. 52 Apart from the purely economic calculations, the importance of the political equations that distinguish China's investments in CEE from other countries has been laid out by Ye Jianming's following statement: "The starting point of CEFC China's investment layout is not merely about economic benefits. Under the guidance of the 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative, it is intended for a friendly relationship between the two countries as well as enhanced cooperation and communication."
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As Olga Lomová, one of the foremost Czech sinologist, noted, for someone who knows just a smidgen about the social structure and political situation in China, it is obvious that a company operating in strategic sectors, such as energy and the gas industry, can be "private" in name only. It is beyond a doubt that the CEFC, whose head is the Czech president's adviser, is a state-run business, most likely directed from the high political ranks in China. Given this, it can be argued that the Chinese state operates in the international arena through the CEFC as if it were a private company and the Czech president has as his adviser a man who is subordinate to the political leadership of the PRC. "[i]f one day the Czech Republic goes against China, we need to pull back our investments to rethink our strategies there."
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Politicisation of Chinese investments in Hungary
The influx of Chinese investment in Hungary seems to also be the tangible result of the excellent political relations between Beijing and "questioning-the-liberal-Western-order" Budapest.
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Hungary's relations with the PRC throughout the 1990s were rather indifferent; however, since Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy's visit to Beijing in 2003, they have become increasingly close, reinforced by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's announcement of the "Opening to the East Policy" initiated in 2010 as a reaction to European financial crisis. As Tamás Matura noted, Orbán's new, pragmatist attitude towards China is noteworthy, given his fierce anticommunist stance during his first premiership (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , marked by the Dalai Lama's visit to his office in 2000. Nowadays, most Hungarian politicians are rather consensual on the Sino-Hungarian political agenda being "completely free of any thorny issues" as they pay special attention to bilateral economic, political, and trade relations with China, attaching great significance and expectations towards the Chinese involvement in the country. 59 In December 2015, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Péter Szijjártó stated that economic and political relations between both countries are the best in their history. 60 The flourishing bilateral relations were solidified in April 2016 as the Hungarian parliament ratified an agreement with China on the Budapest-Belgrade railway construction which was initially approved during the 2013 CEE-China Summit in Bucharest. The modernisation of the Hungarian section of the tracks (166 km) linking both capitals will cost around $1.72 billion, of which the Chinese side will cover 85%. The completion date for the new section, which will shorten the travel time between Budapest and Belgrade from eight to three-and-a-half hours, is scheduled for 2018. 61 The flagship China-CEE cooperation project, however, awaked doubts within the European Commission (EC), which launched a preliminary investigation. According to the Hungarian newspaper Magyar Nemzet, doubts were raised regarding the lack of definition as to what role the Hungarian State Railway (MAV) was to play in the project, as well as their Chinese partners. As per the international agreement, the contractors are the Hungarian State Railway Consortium, Chinese Railway Companies, China Railway International Corporation Ltd., and China Railway International Group. The EC found that the tender procedure had been omitted in certain areas as well as infringed upon market competition laws. Additionally, the unclear role of MAV in the project, as the only company from the EU has only a 15% stake in this undertaking, also intrigued the EC. The Hungarian government has taken up the position that the international agreement is not within the EU's common trade policy's domain, and as such the Hungarian decision does not conflict with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE). What breeds even more doubts is the fact that the terms of the loan are unknown -it is to be paid back within 20 years, yet the interest rate and feasibility study have not been revealed. Another baffling fact that raises doubts is that the investment model used, whereby the Hungarian government has decided to cooperate with the Chinese and pay for the project out of its own pocket, could have been done via the EU, which would have been able to cover 85% of the costs. 62 The PRC's use of Hungary as a way to react to the EU's decisions can be seen in China's endeavour of achieving market-economy status in the EU. The Chinese side is of the opinion that according to the 2001 protocol of China's entry to the WTO, China should be recognised automatically as a market economy from December 11, 2016. Despite ongoing heated discussions within the EU on the matter, Hungary has declared its support to China's efforts already in May 2016, over half a year before the final decision must be made. 63 The instrumentality of China's politics towards Hungary (as well as Greece) as a tool to bolster its political interests with the EU was confirmed again during the EU's attempt to come to a mutual agreement regarding the Hague Tribunal's verdict on the South China Sea dispute. During the EUChina summit in Beijing (12-13 July 2016), the EU did not come to a mutual consensus regarding the decision due to three states backing out: Croatia, Greece, and Hungary. Croatia's distance to the Tribunal's verdict is most likely related to the unresolved territorial dispute between itself and Slovenia regarding the Gulf of Piran. Greece and Hungary's choice not to take part in the joint EU decision was intended as to not disturb their interests with Beijing. Two weeks earlier, the Greek parliament approved the sale of a 67% stake of a port in Pireus to COSCO, which is to invest 500 million EUR in the port over the next five years. Hungary's position, aided by their excellent relations with China, was also dictated by economic motivations, especially by the BelgradeBudapest modernisation project. 64 This political dimension of Chinese investment in Hungary was confirmed via the opinions delivered by politicians of both countries three days after the decision of the Hague Tribunal. At the ASEM-EU summit on 15 July at Ulan Bator, Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi, during a meeting with his Hungarian counterpart Péter Szijjártó, urged to accelerate the implementation of the Budapest-Belgrade railway line and showed his willingness to deepen cooperation in other fields. In turn, the head of the Hungarian diplomacy, following the Chinese position on the South China Sea island dispute, said that disputes should be settled directly by the parties involved, and external pressure is not conducive to peaceful resolution.
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Nevertheless, Hungary's relations with the PRC, contrary to Czech Republic, so far had not received a privilege of being a "strategic partnership" let alone "comprehensive strategic partnership." On the other hand, it is Hungary that has by far attracted the biggest stock of Chinese investments in the whole CEE region.
In view of the repeated political gestures supporting Chinese stance in the international arena, brought out either via own initiative by the representatives of CEE countries or even under political and economic pressure from China, one can venture to the conclusion that one of the reasons the China-CEE relations were conceptualised in the South-South context is the principle of noninterference. The principle of noninterference, which since the 1950s has been China's softpower tool, serving as a key objective of Chinese foreign policy and distinguishing itself from the West, has been helpful in expanding China's political influence in developing countries. Of course, supporting revolutionary movements in the 1960s and 1970s in Africa as well as Asia shows inconsistencies in its implementation, which becomes all the more ambiguous in the light of China's attitude towards Russia's annexation of the Crimea (2014) and the perspective of China's global economic engagement in the world. This will inevitably lead to China's indirect influence on the policies of other countries. 66 According to Richard Q. Turcsanyi, China would probably like to get economic influence in the CEE but the level of influence would be much smaller than the one it has reached in Africa. Actually, it depends mostly on CEE countries how much influence will be given to China. Chinese investments still take a very small share of the investments in the CEE; it will likely take a long time until China would have a list of successful projects that would have any real impact. But what the Chinese side certainly is trying to create is a better image and expectations and they are very active in advertising themselves.
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Conclusion
In the foreign policy field, China attaches great importance to the identity of developing countries and the South-South cooperation which transplants into the PRC's investments in these countries. China's focus on CEE is mainly due to its geographical location and logistic potential being favourable to trade expansion into European markets. In the period since the "16+1" format was founded in 2012, Beijing policy towards CEE states has not proved to be a coherent political strategy towards entire region, being mostly conducted to serve China's economic needs. The implementation of OBOR in the CEE resembles China's policy in Africa and Latin America, aiming to secure access to natural resources and markets together with infrastructure projects. However, there is also a political dimension of China's economic diplomacy in the CEE region that could be observed. Although Sino-European relations are generally defined by the Chinese side in the context of the North-South dichotomy; yet, in Chinese foreign policy rhetoric, CEE countries have been labelled explicitly as countries of the global South. Thus, they are the recipients of developmental investments behind the OBOR strategy which "16+1" is to be complementary with.
The idea of equalising relations between China and CEE with developing-country mechanisms has so far attained a reasonably official status from the Chinese side. Evidence of this can be seen by Xi Jinping's official meeting in Beijing with the 16 CEE countries' leaders in 2015 and citations in articles in Renmin Ribao. In contrast, it is difficult to assess the relationship to the alleged "SouthSouth" dimension of the "16+1" format by the CEE political leaders due to the fact that within official statements or speeches from these authorities the topic seems to be inactive or at best left unsaid. Likewise, it is difficult to ascertain whether there lies a long-term political strategy towards the EU behind the South-South format and the anticipated reconfiguration of relations in Europe, with the United Kingdom's exit from the EU being an introductory element of the coming change. In the case of CEE, in the foreground, one can see above all China's attempts of political influence within these states in exchange for investment promises. It is especially noticeable in the case of the Czech Republic, where President Zeman appointed as an economic adviser Ye Jianming, whose ties to the PRC's political echelons is not in doubt. In terms of direct influence on the decisions of individual CEE countries in line with the wishes of China, the only country that so far has openly supported Beijing's position regarding its market-economy status is Hungary. This relationship could also be seen in the case where Greece and Hungary blocked EU attempts to come to a unanimous position regarding the International Court of Justice's arbitration on the disputed islands in the South China Sea.
Growth of Chinese investments in the Czech Republic and Hungary is clearly due to the excellent political relations facilitated by the antiliberal positions of their governments. Although Western European countries are also soft on China's human rights record, the case of CEE, for example the Czech Republic and Hungary, proves that China is not only calculating the financial benefits of its expansion but also seeking political influence there. Hungary's advocacy to grant China market-economy status and endorsing its stance towards the South China Sea shows that investments do pay off politically. Although the case of CEFC activities in the Czech Republic has been so far secluded, announcements expressed by the company's Chairman and the Czech president's adviser Ye Jianming should be interpreted as a signal that China will seek for more countries to place its political influence in the CEE region. Projection of Chinese prestige into CEE is seemingly the most beneficial to the countries that proved to be ready to offer China political concessions. Interesting in this regard will be the development or regression in relations with China, which will be able to be observed via the decisions of individual member states of the EU to grant China marketeconomy status.
The similarities between the organisational model of the "16+1" and the FOCAC institutional layout bring further associations with China's policy towards developing countries. This is strengthened by the PRC's repeated emphasis of its adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in its relations with the CEE countries. Critics towards the US and the EU voiced from within the former Soviet-bloc countries of CEE, which since the beginning of the 1990s have been perceived as epigons of pro-Western political and economic transformation, combined with growing signs of affirmation towards China's economic achievements may in the longer perspective constitute a challenge to the US and EU position in the CEE region where Western liberal order has been by far the major point of reference as a desired political and socioeconomic model.
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